This talk reopens the issue of studying truth as an operator. Predicates are generally conceived of as being more primitive than operators as several attempts to reduce the first into the latter show. In the case of truth, there are further reasons favoring a predicate approach having to do with the expressive limitations of a truth operator (given a 1st order framework). We argue that a predicate approach does justice to the extensional features of truth, yet it conceals its intensional aspects; for instance, that truth is intrinsically non-perspectival.

We illustrate this by studying truth in a different context than the usual ones, namely, the structure of inverse systems (roughly, a partial order of 1st order models connected by homomorphisms). In order to recover a familiar notion of truth in this environment we make use of a greatest fixed point construction. We then show that truth has intensional content by defining an operator which derives its semantic interpretation from part of the extension of truth as greatest fixed point while behaving like what resembles an S4 modal operator.