In his famous paper “Der Wahrheitsbegriff in den formalisierten Sprachen” (Polish edition: 1933) Alfred Tarski constructs a materially adequate and formally correct definition of the term “true sentence” for certain kinds of formalised languages. In the case of other formalised languages he shows that such a construction is impossible but that the term “true sentence” can nevertheless be consistently postulated. In the Postscript that Tarski added to a later version of this paper (1935), he widens the scope of studied formalised languages and does not explicitly include limits for the kinds of language for which such a construction is possible. This absence of such limits has been interpreted as an implied denial of them: as an implied claim that such a definition of the term “true sentence” can be constructed for every language. This has far-reaching consequences, not least for the idea that Tarski changed from a universalistic to an anti-universalistic standpoint.

I will claim that the consequence of anti-universalism is unwarranted, given that it can be convincingly argued that the Postscript is not in conflict with the existence of limits outside of which a definition of “true sentence” cannot be constructed. Furthermore I will argue that the languages which Tarski studied in the Postscript were still type theoretical, and thus that the Postscript witnesses a gradual change in Tarski’s logical work (compared to the main text), rather than any of the more radical transitions which the Postscript has been claimed to reflect.