Kripke offered a theory of truth that avoids Tarski’s hierarchy of languages. His theory is motivated from the idea that truth of sentences containing the truth predicate is grounded in the truth of sentences without it. But, the theory itself cannot express this notion of groundedness. From this fact it has been inferred that the “[...] ghost of the Tarski hierarchy is still with us” (Kripke).

Against this conclusion, I argue that the expressive limitation of her extensional, first-order theory does not force the friend of grounded truth up a hierarchy of languages. Instead, she may use a basic logic of tense, and say that for it to be true that A, it must have been the case that A earlier. I show that if couched in such a modal logic, a theory of grounded truth can express a sentence’s grounded truth: “possibly, it will henceforth be true”. I state results as to how the resulting theory relates to existent, non-modal theories of truth.