

## Another use of (an)other

Yael Greenberg, Bar Ilan University  
[yaelgree@gmail.com](mailto:yaelgree@gmail.com)

**Synopsis:** This paper deals with a use of pronominal *(an)other*, which has not been described or analyzed so far in the formal semantics literature. As a first illustration consider the attested negative sentences in (1):

- (1) a. *This is not another book about education reform [...] this is a book to be savored. It contributes profoundly to our understanding.*  
b. *This is not another pretty beach. It is Greece's prettiest beach.*  
c. *This is not another movie about werewolves. According to the movie's makers, it will be the first Bollywood movie to meet international standards.*

Intuitively, what the presence of *another* in these sentences leads to is an inference that the referent of their subject constitutes a 'special' or unique member of the nominal set, modified by *another*, e.g. a special book about education reform, a unique pretty beach, a special movie about werewolves, etc.. Below we point out other properties of this use of *(an)other*, which sets it apart from the more familiar and well-studied use. We propose that these properties can be derived from the assumption that while *(an)other* in sentences like (1) has its standard semantics, it is the focus associate of a covert exclusive operator.

### A. A brief background on pronominal (an)other:

Theories of pronominal *(an)other* (as in (2)-(3)) analyze it as in (4) [8],[10]:

- (2) a. *John is another student of mine.* b. *John and Mary are 2 other students of mine.*  
(3) a. *I have another book about education reform.* b. *I have 2 other book(s) about education reform*  
(4)  $\lambda y. \lambda P. \lambda x: P(y). P(x) \wedge \neg y \otimes x$

In (4) *y* stands for a salient singular or plural individual, and gets its value from the context. As seen in (1) and (2) *x* can also stand for a plural or a singular individual. To illustrate, given (4), (2)'s not-at-issue inference is that a salient (singular or plural) individual *y* is in the set of students of mine. In (2a) its first at-issue inference is that John is in the set of students of mine and its second that John does not overlap with *y*. In (2b) the first at-issue inference is that the plurality of John and Mary is in the set of students of mine and the second one is that they do not overlap with *y*.

We note that in such cases focus placement affects the projectivity of the original at-issue contents of *(an)other*, in a way which is similar to what has been observed for other modifiers (cf.[12]). This is illustrated in (5):

(5) (Context: John and Mary saw a tiger and a leopard at the safari. Later on John points to an animal in the distance and says "Oh! Here is another tiger!". Mary responds):

- a. *This is not another[tiger]<sub>F</sub>. (Its actually another leopard).*  
b. *This is not an[other]<sub>F</sub> tiger. (it's actually the same tiger we saw earlier)*

In particular, in (5a), the inference that this animal is a tiger is negated, but the inference that this animal does not overlap a salient individual (i.e. that it is 'other') projects. In (5b), the situation is reversed: the inference that this animal is a tiger projects, but the inference that this animal does not overlap a salient individual (i.e. that it is 'other') is negated. Following e.g. [12] this can be explained due to two different QUDs that the sentence with different foci is congruent with - "Which other animal this is?" and "Which tiger is this?" - respectively. These QUDs in turn trigger two distinct presuppositions: that this animal is 'other', i.e. doesn't overlap the salient individual, and that this animal is a tiger, respectively.

### B. Against this background, we now come back to the new use of (an)other, illustrated in (1) above.

We observe several properties of this novel use of *(an)other*, that the well-studied use in (2),(3),(5) does not have: The first, already pointed out in the synopsis above is its **interpretation**: The referent of the subject is understood to be a special / unique member of the modified nominal set. This inference is not present in (2),(3),(5). The second concerns **Projectivity**: We saw in (5) that, depending on the placement of focus negation either targets the  $P(x)$  inference, or the  $\neg y \otimes x$  one, leading to the inferences that 'x is not a P' or to 'x is the same P as y', respectively. What is interesting about the negative sentences in (1) is that that neither of these inferences is negated, i.e. **both** seem to project. For example, in (1) project. E.g. in (1b) we do not infer that this is not a pretty beach, nor that this pretty beach is the same as a salient one. **Contextual-(in)dependence**: [10] observe that sentences like (2),(3),(5) *(an)other* is odd without a salient individual in the context (*y* in (4)) which satisfies the nominal description (e.g. is odd without a previous utterance of something like *Bill is a student of mine* in (2)). In contrast, in (1) *(an)other* can be felicitously used with no such salient individual (e.g. a book about education reform in the context).

**C. We propose that the properties of this novel use of (an)other in (1) can be derived by taking it to have the same semantics as its well-studied counterpart i.e. (4), but unlike it, to be the focus associate of a covert exclusive operator.** This is supported by observing that sentences like (1) are very natural with overt exclusive like *just* or *merely*. Crucially, with such overt exclusives, these sentences have the same (a) 'special N' interpretation, (b) projectivity properties and (c) context (in)dependence, observed for the sentences in (1). Further attested examples illustrating this point are in (6):

(6) a. *These trees were not just two [other]<sub>F</sub> trees in paradise. They reflected the two most precious types of capital of paradise*

b. *Today is not merely an[other]<sub>F</sub> good Friday, it's the best Friday of the year.*

c. *I don't want to be just an[other]<sub>F</sub> good singer or be just an[other]<sub>F</sub> good male voice. I want to be different. I want have a unique style*

Importantly, we can find this use of (an)other in positive sentences too, as in the attested sentences in (7). Here the inference is reversed: x is inferred to be an ordinary/ non-special member of the nominal, P set:

(7) a. *His son unknowingly drives past his father, thinking he is just another hitchhike*

b. *Why is Margot's beauty so overrated? Without makeup, she's just an[other]<sub>F</sub> Aussie lass.*

c. *Reckless would, of course, have you believe he is different, but he is merely an[other]<sub>F</sub> graduate from the Douglas Carswell School of Politics,*

More formally, we take negative sentences like (1a) to have LF as in (8), where *other* has the same entry as in (4), and where the covert/overt exclusive operator is analyzed as in (9) (following e.g. [3]):

(8) NEG (EXCLUSIVE (C) (*This is an[other]<sub>F</sub> book about education reform*))

(9) Not-at-Issue MIN (p) =  $\lambda w. \exists p' \in C [p'(w) \wedge p \geq p']$  Content: MAX (p) =  $\lambda w. \forall p' \in C [p'(w) \rightarrow p \geq p']$

#### **D. Deriving the properties of the novel use of (an)other from our proposal:**

**Interpretation:** The at-issue content of the exclusive operator - MAX (p) - negates all contextually relevant focus alternatives stronger than the prejacent. We propose that given the focus on *other*, with its non-overlap at-issue entailment, the stronger alternatives here are those where x is distinct from y in a more significant way than (just) not overlapping with it, i.e. those where x has some relevant property that all other entities in P do not have. E.g. in (7b) the stronger alternative entails that there is a relevant property that Margot has, but that all salient Aussie-lasses do NOT have, i.e. that she is a special Aussie-lass. Since the exclusive negates the stronger alternatives, the resulting inference is that Margot does not differ from salient Aussie-lasses in any relevant respect, beyond not overlapping with them, i.e. that she is NOT a special Aussie-lass in any respect. When overt negation is present, as in (6)-(7), it negates the at-issue inference of the exclusive, so we end up with the reversed inference, e.g. (5a) entails this is a special book about education reform.

Notice, though, that since *other* is type <e, <<e,t>, <e,>>> it is not clear whether there is a linguistically available element of the same type that can substitute it to create the stronger alternative. E.g. *special* is type <<e,t>, <e,t>> and hence is not suitable. In the full paper we will examine the possibility that we need to use here non-linguistic alternatives, e.g. semantic alternatives [9], or conceptual ones [2], and the way to constrain such alternatives.

**Projectivity:** We examine two ways to derive the projectivity of the non-overlap inference under negation. One is to deviate from the semantics of EXCLUSIVE in (9) and derive it from the widely-claimed not-at-issue status of the prejacent of exclusives. However, given that this claim has been debated for overt exclusives e.g. [4], and for covert ones [1], another way is to assume that in the negated sentences the truth of the stronger alternatives entails the non-overlap relation (e.g. if this book has a relevant property that other books on education reform do not have, it necessarily does not overlap with them).

**Context (in)dependence:** The exclusive operator requires that all alternatives in C stronger than p are negated (cf. [7] for a recent discussion). To meet this requirement x has to be significantly different from any salient plurality of individuals y, crucially also from the maximal plurality. E.g. in (7b) we must also negate the alternative that Margot has a relevant property that no individual in the maximal plurality of Aussie-lasses has. Since this maximal plurality can be taken to be salient in any context, i.e. is part of the common ground, (an)other in (7b) can be uttered with no reference to a specific salient Aussie-lass(es) in the background.

#### **E. Time permitting we examine (some of) the following open issues:**

**(a) Alongside (an)other, the effects in (6)-(7) can be also found with the incremental use of more (10):**

(10) *Fox Wilde is not just "some more music," it is the next stage in the evolution of music.*

The same holds or e.g. Hebrew, German and Russian incremental particles (*od*, *noch* and *esche*). Indeed, like to *an(other)*, incrementals entail non-overlap [6],[11]. We will examine ways to extend the present proposal to such cases well, and investigate also the prosodical realization of focus with the different types of particles.

**(b): It is not clear what governs the overt/covert of the exclusive operator associating with (an)other and incrementals** E.g. in English the covert exclusive seems possible in negative sentences (1), but not in positive ones (7). In Hebrew (with the incremental *od*) it is possible in both, and in e.g. Russian (with incremental *esche*) in neither.

**(c) Is the covert exclusive operator assumed in (5) identical to *exh* [3] (assumed to play a role in scalar implicatures, some NPIs, etc.)?** E.g. [5] argue that *exh* cannot occur in DE contexts unless accented. While this seems to be the case with the covert exclusive in (5) as well, more empirical as well as theoretical examination is needed here.

**(d) In what way is the exclusive +*another* in such sentences similar to parallel cases with *any*, expressing (in)difference, as in *She will (not) drive just ANY car*?**

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