Finite Model Property for LFD

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My contributions were (i) proposing a notion of **dependence bisimulation** characterizing LFD and (ii) prove the **finite model property**.

Origins

FOL as a Modal Logic

Recall the Tarskian definition if truth of a first-order formula in a model at some variable assignment:

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where $=^x$ is the relation of agreeing 'up to x-values' (for $x \in V$)

$$s = t$$
 iff $s_{|V-\{x\}} = t_{|V-\{x\}}$

for which the quantifier $\exists x \text{ becomes the } \lozenge \text{-modality}!$

This gives rise to the following abstract modal pattern for quantification:

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$$(M,A), s \models \exists X \phi \text{ iff } \exists t \in A \text{ with } s = X \text{ } t \text{ and } (M,A), t \models \phi$$

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The CRS-quantifier $\forall \{x\}$ collapses to $\forall x$ over *full* models (i.e. dependence models $(M, dom(M)^V)$ encoding a standard model)

CRS and Locality

A disadvantage of this specific way of generalising first-order quantification is that CRS fails to satisfy a property called **Locality**, in contrast to FOL

Locality Whether $M, s \models \phi$ depends only on $free(\phi)$

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However, there are conceptual problems arising from this move; e.g. $\exists X\phi \leadsto \exists X(\phi \land z=z)$ conjoining a tautology changes the meaning of the formula (witnessing assignment has to agree on $z \not\in X$ with s as well)

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(Commutation)
$$\exists x \exists y \phi \rightarrow \exists y \exists x \phi$$

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The failure of the above Commutation axiom merely establishes a dependency in the sense of the negation of independence. Here we will look at the far stronger notion of *functional* dependence

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LFD studies the more fine-grained notion of **local dependence**:

$$(M,A), s \models D_X y \quad \text{iff} \quad \forall t \in A(\bigwedge_{x \in X} s(x) = t(x) \rightarrow s(y) = t(y))$$

which says that whenever the values of X are fixed to the *current* values, then also the y-value will be the same as the *current* one.

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LFD is classical (and decidable), in contrast to dependence logics based on team semantics \rightsquigarrow dependence not intrinsically non-classical

A Typical Amsterdam Database Example

Row	Coffeeshop	Specialty	Price	Location
1	Dampkring	Skywalker	Moderate	Center
2	Paradox	Hindu Kush	Expensive	Center
3	Boerejongens	S5 Haze	Moderate	Center
4	Cheech & Chong's	S5 Haze	Cheap	West
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global dependencies:

Coffeeshop \rightarrow {Specialty, Price, Location}

 $\{\mathsf{Specialty, Location}\} \to \{\mathsf{Price, Coffeeshop}\}$

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The Logic of Functional Dependence

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Time permitting, we may go into more detail about the relation between CRS and LFD, and how LFD solves an open problem from (van Benthem, 1996) or even dependence bisimulations.

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Definition (Syntax)

The language $LFD[V, \tau]$ over (V, τ) is recursively defined by:

$$\varphi ::= P\mathbf{x} \mid \neg \varphi \mid \varphi \wedge \varphi \mid \mathbb{D}_{\mathbf{X}}\varphi \mid D_{\mathbf{X}}\mathbf{y}$$

where $X \subseteq_{\omega} V$ $y \in V$, $P \in \tau$ and $\mathbf{x} = (x_1, ..., x_n) \in V^{ar(P)}$.

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Furthermore, we abbreviate $D_XY:=\bigwedge_{y\in Y}D_xy$ and $\mathbb{E}_X\varphi:=\neg\mathbb{D}_X\neg\varphi$.

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The semantics clauses are as follows (Booleans as usual):

$$s \models Px \text{ iff } s(x) \in I^M(P)$$

$$s \models \mathbb{D}_X \varphi \text{ iff } t \models \varphi \text{ holds for all } t \in A \text{ with } s =_X t$$

$$s \models D_X y \text{ iff } s =_X t \text{ implies } s =_y t \text{ for all } t \in A.$$



LFD satisfies Locality

For every $\varphi \in LFD$, we define its **free variables** by:

- $free(D_X y) = X$
- $free(\mathbb{D}_X\varphi)=X$
- $free(Px_1...x_n) = \{x_1, ..., x_n\}$
- $free(\neg \varphi) = free(\varphi)$
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In contrast to CRS, LFD does satisfy Locality! (just like FOL)

(Locality): If $s =_X t$ then $s \models \varphi$ iff $t \models \varphi$, whenever $free(\varphi) \subseteq X$

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- $tr(\mathbb{D}_X\psi) := \forall \mathbf{z}(A\mathbf{v} \to tr(\psi))$
- $tr(D_X x) := \top_X (\bigwedge_{x \in X} x = x)$ (for $x \in X$)
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e.g. if
$$V = \{x, y, z\}$$
 we have $tr(\mathbb{D}_x Rxy) = \forall yz(Axyz \to Rxy)$ and $tr(D_x y) = \forall yz \forall y'z'((Axyz \land Axy'z') \to y = y')$

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e.g. if $V = \{x, y, z\}$ we have $tr(\mathbb{D}_x Rxy) = \forall yz(Axyz \to Rxy)$ and $tr(D_x y) = \forall yz \forall y'z'((Axyz \land Axy'z') \to y = y')$

The correspondence $\mathbb{M}=(M,A)\leadsto \mathcal{T}(\mathbb{M})$ is one-to-one, where

$$I^{T(\mathbb{M})}(A) := \{s(\mathbf{v}) \mid s \in A\}$$

Theorem (Baltag & Van Benthem, 2021)

$$\mathbb{M}, s \models \psi$$
 iff $T(\mathbb{M}), s \models tr(\psi)$

It follows that ψ and $tr(\psi)$ are equi-satisfiable and so LFD inherits Compactness, Löwenheim-Skolem properties and recursive enumerability of its validities from FOL.

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Our observation suggest building on Grädel's proof of the fmp for GF, which uses Herwig's theorem on extending partial isomorphisms.

We deviate from Grädel's approach by using *quasi-models* (here called 'type models') rather than a Scott Normal form.

The **closure** Ψ of an LFD-formula ψ is defined as the closure of $\{\psi\}$ under subformulas, single negations and all $D_X y$ for X, y occurring in ψ .

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Then $\Delta \subseteq \Psi$ is a **type** (for Ψ) if it satisfies:

(a)
$$\neg \psi \in \Delta$$
 iff $\psi \notin \Delta$

(d)
$$D_X x \in \Delta$$
 for all $x \in X$

(b)
$$(\psi \wedge \chi) \in \Delta$$
 iff $\psi \in \Delta$ and $\chi \in \Delta$ (e) $D_X Y, D_Y Z \in \Delta$ implies

(c) if
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$$\text{iff} \qquad \{\psi \in \Delta \mid \mathit{free}(\psi) \subseteq \mathsf{D}_{\mathsf{X}}^{\Delta}\} = \{\psi \in \Delta' \mid \mathit{free}(\psi) \subseteq \mathsf{D}_{\mathsf{X}}^{\Delta}\}$$

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where $D_X^{\Delta} = \{ y \in V \mid D_X y \in \Delta \}$ the **dependence-closure** of X w.r.t Δ .

A **type model** is a set of $(\Psi$ -)types $\mathfrak M$ such that:

- (e) if $\mathbb{E}_X \psi \in \Delta$ then $\exists \Delta' \in \mathfrak{M}$ with $\Delta \sim_X \Delta'$ and $\psi \in \Delta$
- (f) \sim_{\emptyset} is the universal relation on \mathfrak{M}

Representing Type Models as Dependence Models

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if
$$\pi = (\Delta_0)$$
 is the root, $v_{\pi} = (\pi, v)$ for all $v \in V$
if $\pi = (\pi' \sim_X last(\pi))$, $v_{\pi}(v) = (\pi', x)$ if $v \in D_X^{last(\pi)}$
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$$\begin{split} \text{if } \pi &= (\Delta_0) \text{ is the root}, \quad v_\pi &= (\pi, v) \qquad \text{ for all } v \in V \\ \text{if } \pi &= (\pi' \sim_X \textit{last}(\pi)), \quad v_\pi(v) &= (\pi', x) \qquad \text{ if } v \in D_X^{\textit{last}(\pi)} \\ v_\pi(v) &= (\pi, v) \qquad \text{ if } v \not\in D_X^{\Delta_n} \end{split}$$

The collection of such paths forms a tree under \leq . For every node π there is a |V|-sized guarded submodel $v_{\pi}[V]$

Bounded Tree-width Model: Drawing the Frame

(drawing)

We can build a model M of bounded tree-width on such objects (π, x) by:

$$\mathbf{u} \in I(P)$$
 iff $\mathbf{u} = v_{\pi}(\mathbf{x})$ for some $v_{\pi} \in A$ with $P\mathbf{x} \in last(\pi)$

Together with our team A this is a dependence model $\mathbb{M}=(M,A)$ which represents \mathfrak{M} , i.e. $\{type(v_{\pi}) \mid v_{\pi} \in A\} = \mathfrak{M}$.

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Theorem (Truth Lemma)

$$\mathbb{M}, v_{\pi} \models \psi \quad iff \quad \psi \in last(\pi)$$

This holds because for each type $\Delta \in \mathfrak{M}$ there is a path $\pi_{\Delta} = (\Delta_0 \sim_{\emptyset} \Delta)$ such that $type(v_{\pi_{\Delta}}) = last(\pi_{\Delta}) = \Delta$ by the above truth lemma.

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The fmp asks whether every type model can be represented by a **finite** dependence model!

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Me: Cut at level 3 and apply Herwig's theorem w.r.t. a *special choice of symmetries*. Encode dependence formulas with atoms $R^{X,y}\mathbf{x}$ and use *extra conditions* guaranteed by the theorem to ensure dependencies will be respected in the process of extension. Then there is a dependence bisimulation between the finite Herwig extension and our infinite bounded tree-width model.

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There is also a proof of the fmp through the modal semantics using am even stronger version of Herwig's theorem

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We **cut** \mathbb{M} **at height 3** as each type $\Delta \in \mathfrak{M}$ occurs as $type(v_{\pi_{\Delta}})$ for the path $\pi_{\Delta} = (\Delta_0 \sim_{\emptyset} \Delta)$. Call the resulting dependence model \mathbb{M}_{cut}

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We want to apply **Herwig's theorem** to $T(\mathbb{M}_{cut})$, making sure the Herwig extension will respect the interpretation of dependence atoms in the underlying types.

The key idea is to use fresh atomic formulas $R^{X,y}\mathbf{x}$ to **encode the dependence atoms** D_Xy . If we can show that $R^{X,y}\mathbf{x} \leftrightarrow D_Xy$ holds in the Herwig extension, we would be done by Grädel's result.

Herwig's theorem

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Theorem (Herwig)

Let σ be a finite relational language, C a finite σ -structure and $p_1,...,p_k$ partial isomorphisms on C. Then there exists a finite extension C^+ of C that satisfies the following conditions:

- (i) Every p_i extends to a unique automorphism $\widehat{p_i}$ of C^+ [inducing a subgroup $\langle \widehat{p_1}, ..., \widehat{p_k} \rangle$ of $Aut(C^+)$]
- (ii) If a tuple \mathbf{c} from C^+ is guarded or a singleton, then there exists an automorphism $f \in \langle \widehat{p}_1, ..., \widehat{p}_k \rangle$ such that for each $c_i \in \mathbf{c}$, $f(c_i) \in C$.
- (iii) If $\exists f \in \langle \widehat{p_1}, ..., \widehat{p_k} \rangle$ and $c, c' \in C$ such that f(c) = c', then either f = id or there is a unique $p \in \langle p_1, ..., p_k \rangle$ such that $\widehat{p} = f$

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we make a choice of partial isomorphisms and make crucial use of (iii).

Cut-Off Model: Expansion and Partial Isomorphisms

$$p_{\pi}: v_{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \mapsto v_{\pi_{\Delta}}(\mathbf{v})$$
 where $last(\pi) = \Delta$

$$I(R^{X,y}) := \{s(\mathbf{x}) \mid s \in A\}$$

The Herwig Extension

By Herwig's theorem we obtain a dependence model $\mathbb{M}^+_{cut} = (M^+_{cut}, A^+_{cut})$ w.r.t. the partial iso's $p_{\pi}: v_{\pi}(\mathbf{v}) \mapsto v_{\pi_{\Delta}}(\mathbf{v})$ for $lh(\pi) = 3$, $last(\pi) = \Delta$.

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We let $type(s) = last(\pi)$ for $s \xrightarrow{f} v_{\pi}$ of level 2. This is well-defined by (iii) and properties of $\langle p_1, ..., p_k \rangle$, and note that $type(v_{\pi}) = last(\pi)$.

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$$\mathbb{M}_{cut}^+, s \models R^{X,y} \mathbf{x} \leftrightarrow D_X y \qquad \forall s \in A_{cut}^+$$

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Encoding Lemma Proof

Lemma

If $p \in \langle p_1, ..., p_k \rangle$ is such that $pv_{\pi} =_X v_{\pi'}$, there are $v_{\rho}, v_{\rho'} \in A_{cut}$ with $v_{\pi} =_X v_{\rho}, v_{\pi'} =_X v_{\rho'}$ and $pv_{\rho} = v_{\rho'}$ which implies that $last(\rho) = last(\rho')$.

 $[D_x y \in \mathit{last}(\sigma) \text{ and } v_\sigma =_X v_{\sigma'} \text{ implies } v_\sigma =_y v_{\sigma'} \text{ for } v_\sigma, v_{\sigma'} \in A_{cut}]$

Finite Model Property via Bisimulation

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We finish the proof by giving a dependence bisimulation

$$Z := \{(s, v_{\pi}) \in A^+_{cut} \times A \mid type(s) = last(\pi)\}$$

between the **finite** Herwig extension \mathbb{M}_{cut}^+ and the **infinite** unravelling \mathbb{M} . It follows that \mathbb{M}_{cut}^+ is a finite dependence model representing \mathfrak{M} .

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Theorem (Finite Model Property)

LFD has the finite model property (w.r.t. the intended semantics)

Extra Topics

(time permitting)

The authors provide a complete Hilbert-style axiomatization as well as a complete sequent-calculus with a restricted form of cut-elimination

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Table 1 The proof system LFD

(I)	Axioms and rules of classical propositional logic
(II)	Axioms and rules for dependence modalities $\mathbb D$
(D-Necessitation)	From φ , infer $\mathbb{D}_X \varphi$
(D-Distribution)	$\mathbb{D}_X(\varphi \to \psi) \to (\mathbb{D}_X \varphi \to \mathbb{D}_X \psi)$
$(\mathbb{D}$ -Introduction)	$\varphi \to \mathbb{D}_X \varphi$, provided that $Free(\varphi) \subseteq X$
(D-Elimination)	$\mathbb{D}_X \varphi \to \varphi$
(III)	Axioms for dependence atoms D
(Projection)	$D_X x$, provided that $x \in X$
(Transitivity)	$(D_XY \wedge D_YZ) \to D_XZ$
(IV)	Axiom for $\mathbb{D} ext{-}D$ interaction
(Transfer)	$(D_XY \wedge \mathbb{D}_Y\varphi) \to \mathbb{D}_X\varphi$

CRS (without substitutions) is completely axiomatized by poly-modal S5 for the $\exists X$ modalities plus the schemata

$$P\mathbf{x} \to \forall Y P\mathbf{x}, \qquad \neg P\mathbf{x} \to \forall Y \neg P\mathbf{x} \qquad \text{where no } y \in Y \text{ occurs in } \mathbf{x}$$

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boils down to a couple of relevant instances, including

$$Px_{1}...x_{n} \to \mathbb{D}_{\{x_{1},...,x_{n}\}}Px_{1}...x_{n} \qquad (schema)$$

$$\neg Px_{1}...x_{n} \to \mathbb{D}_{\{x_{1},...,x_{n}\}}\neg Px_{1}...x_{n} \qquad (schema)$$

$$\mathbb{D}_{X}\varphi \to \mathbb{D}_{X}\mathbb{D}_{X}\varphi \qquad (4)$$

$$\neg \mathbb{D}_{X} \varphi \to \mathbb{D}_{X} \mathbb{D}_{X} \varphi \tag{5}$$

Comparing LFD and CRS: Translations

Over a *finite* set V of variables, CRS-quantifiers and dependence quantifiers are inter-definable:

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Even the local versions are inter-definable with dependence quantifiers:

$$\widetilde{\forall}_X \phi \equiv \mathbb{D}_{Free(\phi)-X} \phi$$
 $\mathbb{D}_X \phi \equiv \forall_{Free(\phi)-X} (\phi \wedge \top_X)$

where \top_X is any tautology in variables X (e.g. $\bigwedge_{x \in X} x = x$)

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Even the local versions are inter-definable with dependence quantifiers:

$$\widetilde{\forall}_X \phi \equiv \mathbb{D}_{\mathsf{Free}(\phi) - X} \phi \qquad \qquad \mathbb{D}_X \phi \equiv \forall_{\mathsf{Free}(\phi) - X} (\phi \wedge \top_X)$$

where \top_X is any tautology in variables X (e.g. $\bigwedge_{x \in X} x = x$)

For an infinite V, the two notions seem to be independent; $\mathbb{D}_{V-x}\varphi$ and $\forall V-X\varphi$ are not formulas if V is infinite.

Modal Semantics

We now turn to the modal perspective on LFD, to see how it challenges CRS's update relation $=^x$ as the right way of representing abstract modal models/frames as dependence models.

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A general relational model is a structure $\mathbb{A} = (A, \sim_X, D_X y, P\mathbf{x})$ s.t.

- (1) All \sim_X are equivalence relations
- (2) $\{(X,y) \mid s \in ||D_Xy||\}$ satisfies Projection and Transitivity
- (3) $||P\mathbf{x}||$ is a union of sets of the form $[s]_X$
- (4) \sim_{\emptyset} is the universal relation
- $(5) ||D_X y|| \subseteq \{s \in A \mid [s]_X \subseteq [s]_y\}$
- $(6) \sim_{X \cup Y} \subseteq \sim_X \cap \sim_Y$

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A **standard relational model** is a a general relational model \mathbb{A} where (5),(6) are equalities, then all information is carried by the reduct $\mathbb{A} = (A, \sim_x, P\mathbf{x})$ because the interpretations for \sim_X and D_Xy are determined by the relations \sim_x for $x \in V$.

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Theorem (Baltag & Van Benthem, 2021)

Type models, dependence models and standard and general relational models all provide equivalent semantics for LFD

Call the *skeleton* of a dependence model $\mathbb{M} = (M, A)$ the abstract modal model $(A, (=^x)_{x \in V}, I)$ induced by it. What characterizes the skeletons?

¹The path principles for $=^X$ are **duals** of the inclusions $\sim_X \cap \sim_Y \subseteq \sim_X \cup \sim_X \subset \sim_X \circ \sim$

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Theorem (Van Benthem, 1996)

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Theorem (Now, 2021)

An abstract modal model $(A, (R_x)_{x \in V}, I)$ is isomorphic to a skeleton* iff (i) each R_x is an equivalence relation and (ii) $||P\mathbf{x}||$ is a union of sets of the form $[s]_X = \{t \in A \mid (s,t) \in \bigcap_{x \in X} R_x\}$

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My definition allows for more efficient algorithms for bisimilarity checking that are not exponential in |V|.

Invariance

Proof:

Conclusion

Summary

We have discussed the origins of LFD arising from the study of generalised assignment models and CRS. If time has permitted it we have seen how LFD is a sense dual to CRS, and how it solves an open problem posed by Johan in 2005. The connection with dependence logics remains relatively unexplored...

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We introduced LFD and proved completeness and decidability via an infinite representation of type models. Then we went through the proof of the fmp through Herwig's theorem, pinpointing the differences with GF.

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We introduced LFD and proved completeness and decidability via an infinite representation of type models. Then we went through the proof of the fmp through Herwig's theorem, pinpointing the differences with GF.

The size of the Herwig extension is non-elementary in case of unbounded arities, but in our case it can be bounded by a |V|-tower of exponentials. The modal proof of the fmp ensures maximal arity 2. One may also find smaller models using an appropriate notion of *Rosati cover* as with GF.

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knowledge wh-, mixed readings, dynamic logic of group-readings, logic of continuous dependence, causality, strategic dependence, dynamical systems.......

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