Please join us for the forthcoming meeting of the Dutch Social Choice Colloquium on Friday, 14 June 2019 in Rotterdam. The next meeting after that is tentatively planned for October 2019 in Amsterdam.
Location: Room T3-25, Mandeville Building, Campus Woudestein, Erasmus University Rotterdam (directions)
Hosts: Måns Abrahamson, Constanze Binder, Kirsten Rohde (Erasmus University Rotterdam)
|14:00-15:00||Kirsten Rohde (Erasmus University Rotterdam) |
Social Risk Attitudes for Health and Money
Abstract: Many risks have a social as well as an individual dimension. This paper studies attitudes towards social risks for health and money. In an experiment, participants are asked to report their certainty equivalents of risks that are distributed over individuals in society. In every society, all individuals face the same risks. Societies differ regarding the correlations of risks across individuals. Attitudes towards such correlations shed light onto people’s concerns for inequality and collective risk (Rohde and Rohde, 2015). In this study we compare decisions for social risks concerning health and money. We also compare social risks framed in terms of gains and losses. (This is joint work with Ingrid Rohde.)
|15:15-16:15||Wulf Gaertner (Universität Osnabrück) |
An Experimental Game of Loss Sharing
Abstract: We conduct a lab-experimental study of bargaining over the distribution of monetary losses. Groups of four differently endowed participants must agree, as a group, on the contribution each participant will make to cover a financial loss imposed on the group. The study sheds light on burden sharing and what kind of loss allocation rules groups are willing to adopt. Given the experimental results that we gathered, two rules stand out as possible explananda, the constrained equal awards rule which has been characterized by Moulin (2000) and Herrero and Villar (2001) and a new theoretical model that will be characterized in this paper. Many proposals that participants made are close to a progressive rule which exempts the person with the lowest endowment from any losses and puts a larger burden on those with higher endowments. Such proposals can be explained by our model. However, there is also a large number of proposals which suggest that the two lowest groups in terms of initial endowments be exempted from any loss sharing. Such proposals are in conformity with the constrained equal awards rule. (This is joint work with Lars Schwettmann and Yongsheng Xu.)
|16:30-17:30||Erik Schokkaert (KU Leuven) |
Empirical Social Choice with Incomplete and Unstable Preferences
Abstract: Different papers in empirical social choice have worked with different interpretations of the overall concept of "individual preferences" and/or have implicitly assumed that the preference relation is stable and complete. I will illustrate this for some of the findings obtained with large representative surveys and I will argue that a stronger theoretical framework is needed to make this research useful for normative analysis. Questionnaire-experimental work fares better in this regard but has also largely neglected that preferences may be unstable and/or incomplete. I propose to add a deliberation stage to the empirical setup of these studies. I finally discuss the pros and cons of survey experimental work with representative populations and incentivized respondents.
Note: This session of the DSCC is organised jointly with the Tinbergen Institute.