Gödel

We discussed some popular misinterpretations of Gödel’s Theorem.

These were (1) Lucas/Penrose style of arguments against mechanism, (2) GIT as a confirmation of Platonism, (3) The “postmodern” interpretation.

The talk was given by Jan Gronwald.

Main Readings:

• (Benacerraf, 1967) God, the Devil and Gödel. in: The Monist 51(1): pp. 9-32.

• (Copeland and Shagrir, 2013), Turing versus Gödel on Computability and the Mind, in: B. Copeland, C. Posy, O. Shagrir (ed.), „Computability: Turing, Gödel, Church, and Beyond”. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.

• (Krajewski, 2020) On the Anti-Mechanist Arguments Based on Gödel’s Theorem, in: „Studia Semiotyczne”, doi.org/10.26333/sts.xxxiv1.02.

• (Shapiro, 2016) Idealization, Mechanism, and Knowability, in: L. Horsten, P. Welch (ed.), „Gödel’s Disjunction: The scope and limits of mathematical knowledge”. Oxford Univ. Press

• (Wang, 1974). From Mathematics to Philosophy. Oxon: Routledge

Our next reading meeting will revolve around Solomon Feferman’s article Gödel’s Incompleteness Theorems, Free Will and Mathematical Thought.

The paper can be freely accessed from the Mathematics Department site at the University of Stanford.

During the meeting, Ezra will present the paper, followed by a discussion.

Slides used in the presentation are available here.

For this special Christmas meeting, Rodrigo will be introducing Kurt Gödel’s argument about the existence of God, a classic medieval argument formalized in modal logic.

No reading preparation is required.

During the session, Rodrigo will present the argument, followed by a discussion.

Slides used during the presentation are available here. See also a handout with the proof.